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by Tatiana Falcão
The goal of this article is to connect overseas 
development assistance (ODA) with the 
international tax framework more generally, and 
double tax treaties in particular. The 2017 revision of 
the OECD and U.N. models have had the effect of 
revising the preamble of both models and 
conferring on them a revived objective, which is no 
longer restricted to the avoidance of double 
taxation, but also includes forestalling 
“opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation 
through tax avoidance or evasion.”1 They do so 
without paying attention to equity or distributional 
considerations among the treaty states.
Bilateral tax treaties are concerned with tax 
base allocation between states, splitting them into 
source and residence countries. Within the realm of 
ODA, to put it crassly, the primary concern is 
redistribution and assistance granted by rich 
countries to poor. However, redistribution is 
significantly affected by tax considerations, as this 
article will demonstrate. If improperly attuned, the 
interaction between redistribution and taxation — 
two seemingly distinct but parallel cash flow and 
transfer networks — can create a system that first 
allocates most (or as many as possible) taxing rights 
to the resident state, and then requires the 
residence state to donate a part of the accumulated 
resources to the source state through direct or 
indirect transfers in the form of ODA.
The first part of this article discusses the 
trends in ODA, following the data publicized in 
the April 13 Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing 
for Development (IATF) report, “Financing for 
Development: Progress and Prospects 2018.” It 
discusses some of the conditions for redistribution 
of funds to recipient states — in particular, by 
considering the exemption mandated by most 
international assistance projects. The second part 
considers how the tax system might provide a 
better answer to the issue of redistribution, if 
redistributive goals were included in the 
preamble of bilateral tax treaties. It further 
highlights how national rent might be allocated in 
accordance with inter-nation equity principles.
ODA Trends
According to the OECD,2 ODA is defined as 
“government aid designed to promote the 
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U.N. model (2017), preamble; and OECD model, preamble.
2
OECD, Net ODA (indicator) (2018).
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economic development and welfare of developing 
countries.” Loans and credits for military 
purposes are excluded from the definition.
ODA is an aid transfer that developed 
countries pay to developing countries to assist 
development. The word “aid” is not synonymous 
with a cash transfer, however. The aid may be in 
cash, but it can also be in kind, a grant, a “soft 
loan” (in which the grant element is at least 25 
percent of the total), or technical assistance.
Donor countries tend to prefer to tie their 
donations to a particular project through targeted 
assistance (for example, building schools or 
hospitals, or running a vaccination campaign). 
Donations can also be connected with an 
emergency situation, such as a natural disaster, 
humanitarian crisis, or event that requires 
peacekeeping operations.
Under the U.N. system, countries are divided 
into high-, middle-, and low-income countries. 
High-income countries are generally referred to 
as developed countries; middle- and low-income 
countries make up the developing country 
category. Among developing countries, there are 
least developed countries, small island 
developing states, and landlocked developing 
countries. There are 150 countries and territories 
within the developing country category with 2010 
per capita incomes below $12,276. This figure, 
incidentally, is the ceiling to qualify for ODA. Per 
capita incomes of about $12,200 trigger 
graduation from ODA eligibility, because this 
level of per capita income signals a move from 
middle-income to high-income country levels. 
Jurisdictions with per capita incomes below 
$1,200 are classified as low-income; those with 
incomes between $1,200 and $12,200 constitute 
the middle-income countries, the largest 
category.3
A standard proxy to measure the degree to 
which a country is rich or poor is gross national 
income (GNI) — sometimes also expressed as 
GDP. The U.N. has set 0.7 percent of GNI as a 
donor country contribution target for ODA. 
According to the 2018 IATF report, only 
Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom met or 
exceeded the U.N. target. On average, OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
donors4 contributed only 0.32 percent of GNI. 
Between 2015 and 2016, nine DAC members 
actually decreased their ODA contributions to 
least-developed countries.5 In the aggregate, the 
IATF report shows an ODA increase in real terms 
of 10.7 percent in 2016, contributing to an overall 
rising trend.
However, further analysis shows that ODA 
contributions tend to increase at times of crisis or 
emergency, such as a major weather event. The 
2015-2016 increase in ODA is partially explained 
by an increase in funds for hosting and processing 
refugees in the donee states.6 Likewise, an 
increase in ODA to small island developing states 
resulted from two extraordinary events: Spain’s 
restructuring of Cuba’s debt and a spike in ODA 
flows into Haiti because of the earthquake. 
Absent these events, the pattern would have been 
one of decreased flows to all categories of 
developing countries.7
In the same vein, country programmable aid 
(CPA) (the share of aid that providers can 
program for individual countries and regions 
over which recipient countries have a significant 
say) and budget support have also declined.8
This means that countries are getting less of a 
chance to say where the money, grant, or asset 
they are receiving will be employed, and 
receiving less ownership over deployment of the 
funds in their economy. Non-budgeted funds may 
be synonymous with one-off deals, and countries 
cannot rely on donor countries to make 
investments in infrastructure, education, and 
health — key investment areas within any 
country’s government structure.
When these non-budgeted funds are 
earmarked for a particular project (also known as 
“international project assistance”), a further 
3
United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for 
Development, “Financing for Development: Progress and Prospects 
2018,” at 88-109 (2018).
4
The DAC currently has 30 members, which roughly coincides with 
the OECD membership.
5
IATF report, supra note 3, at 89.
6
Although the IATF argues that even without that increase in funds 
to handle the refugee crisis, ODA would have increased by 8.6 percent in 
real terms. See IATF report, supra note 3, at 88.
7
OECD, “Development Co-operation Report 2018: Joining Forces to 
Leave No One Behind” (July 10, 2018).
8
IATF report, supra note 3, at 89.
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problem arises in the current donor practice of 
requesting ODA tax exemptions.
ODA Tax Exemption
The U.N. Committee of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters has been 
working on the tax treatment of donor-financed 
projects almost from its inception in 2005. The first 
paper was released in 2006.9 According to the 
U.N., tax exemptions relating to international aid 
can take various forms:
Imports of goods may be exempt from 
customs duties, VAT (or other general 
sales tax), excises and other indirect taxes. 
Goods or services procured locally may be 
exempt from VAT or sales tax. Income tax 
exemption may be extended to persons 
working under contracts (for example, 
employees and enterprises).10
Exemptions may be included in double tax 
treaties or bilateral agreements, but they can also 
be granted via the domestic tax system or through 
specific legislation introduced to directly address 
ODA.
Exemptions are a mechanism through which 
countries ensure that aid will be used only in the 
approved project, and that none of the resources 
will directly or indirectly contribute to the 
country’s general budget. However, exemptions 
related to a particular international project 
assistance can take various forms within the 
targeted country’s tax system and create serious 
equity problems. They might involve, for 
example:
• an exemption from customs duties and VAT 
on the import of goods by a nonresident 
(without reexport obligations);
• an exemption from profits tax for a 
nonresident contractor providing services 
financed with project funds without a 
permanent establishment in the country; or
• an exemption from individual personal 
income tax and social security contributions 
for resident individuals hired to work for a 
resident or nonresident contractor operating 
with project funds.11
Exemptions are the result of a donor country’s 
unwillingness to provide budgetary support to 
the recipient country, despite international calls to 
increase this type of assistance.12 The preference of 
providing targeted or project-based assistance is 
driven by the fear that otherwise the funds will be 
misused or misappropriated in the recipient 
country, especially if the recipient is tarnished 
with corruption. Additionally, budgetary support 
may suffer from a failure of donor country 
political support for direct cash transfers. It is 
easier to justify a large donation when one can 
physically verify the construction of ten hospitals 
than it is to justify a cash transfer that became part 
of a country’s general budget.
Despite potentially increasing the 
transactional cost of administering the donated 
money, donor countries continue asking for 
recipient country exemptions,13 creating serious 
equity problems and further complicating frail 
domestic tax systems. Draft guidelines meant to 
deal with this issue were prepared by the staff of 
the International Tax Dialogue Steering Group in 
2007 and put forward for consideration by the tax 
committee. However, the guidelines never made 
it past the approval stage.14
The sums at stake are substantial, particularly 
from a developing country perspective. 
According to the U.N. document, in Niger, for 
example, “tax expenditures on vouchers — one 
method by which exemptions may be 
implemented — amounted in 2002 to 18 [percent] 
of project financing, and 10 [percent] of total tax 
revenue.”15 One could argue that the project 
would not have taken place without the ODA, 
9
United Nations, Second Session of the Committee of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters, “Tax Treatment of Donor-




Id., at 5. This is not a complete list. The document provides a more 
thorough list of cases in which a donee country might be required to 
confer an exemption.
12
See IATF report, supra note 3.
13
In 2004 the World Bank changed its policy and determined that it 
would allow financing of nondiscriminatory tax costs, provided they are 
reasonable. The assessment is done on a country-by-country basis but 
tends to cover virtually all taxes in a recipient state. The Inter-American 
Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank also revised their 
policies following the World Bank’s decision.
14
United Nations, Third Session of the Committee of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters, “Tax Treatment of Donor-
Financed Projects,” E/C.18/2007/CRP.12 (2007).
15
See E/C.18/2006/5, supra note 9.
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and that the revenue would not have arisen in the 
first place. However, not all projects rely 
exclusively on another country’s public funds.
Tax Exemptions and Blended Finance
Blended finance is an increasingly popular 
form of development assistance.16 It “uses 
financial instruments such as grants, loans, 
guarantees and equity to improve the risk-return 
profile of investments, [and] to mobilize 
additional commercial financing that would not 
have been available without public 
intervention.”17 In other words, blended finance 
uses public resources from a donor country to 
attract foreign direct investment to a recipient 
country or region by making it more attractive to 
private foreign investors. It uses development 
finance to engage commercial actors and finance 
in sustainable development projects. These 
commercial instruments are often referred to in 
economic literature as “catalyzing instruments.”
When extended to blended finance 
instruments, tax exemptions targeting ODA 
funds might pose an even more serious threat. 
Take the example of the contractor (resident in the 
recipient state) who receives an exemption of 
individual income tax and social security 
contributions. Assume that the private 
corporation contributing to blending finance 
through investment (which may take the form of 
an equity-financed expansion of its infrastructure 
services) is part of the multinational group 
partnering with the donor country to catalyze the 
project’s financing structure. Assume further that 
the project is executed and managed by a 
contractor belonging to the corporation’s 
multinational group.
The effect of a proposed exemption would be 
to create unfair competition in the host state. No 
other player (domestic or foreign) would be able 
to compete or invest in the same field, because the 
conditions for investment by the foreign financing 
partner would be significantly and unreasonably 
better than normal conditions. This effect could 
tamper with the “temporariness” of a blending 
finance project.18
Depending on the significance of the project 
for the domestic economy, the exemption could 
also have a negative impact on the country’s social 
security system, possibly creating a crisis. The 
consequences might all be averted through 
regulation and a solid transparency framework, 
as mandated by the OECD’s DAC blended finance 
principles.19 However, in reality, most ODA 
recipients do not have strong regulatory 
frameworks. This is an area in which policy is 
being developed almost ad hoc and in tandem 
with the execution of real projects. There is not 
enough tax exemption/blended finance-related 
literature or guidance to rule out the above 
scenario.20
Furthermore, exemptions may limit a 
country’s ability to accumulate resources that 
could be used in areas that are not targeted by 
private investors. According to the IATF report, 
blended facilities and funds tend to target 
sustainable development goal investment areas in 
which the business case is clearer: energy, growth, 
infrastructure, and climate action, for example. 
Important public areas such as education, 
ecology, and the consolidation of a strong 
institutional framework for peace and justice are 
left destitute of funds, despite being key U.N. 
sustainable development goals.21
Could the Tax System Provide the Answer?
According to the IATF report, both CPA and 
budget support — the two types of aid over which 
partner countries can have a significant say in 
fund deployment — have declined in recent 
years.
16
The OECD found that donor governments had set up 167 dedicated 
facilities between 2000 and 2016 to pool public financing for blending, 
using a variety of approaches and instruments. Volumes are increasing 
annually, from $15 billion in 2012 to $26.8 billion in 2015. OECD, 
“Development Co-operation Report 2018,” at 32.
17
IATF report, supra note 3, at 102.
18
OECD, “OECD DAC Blended Finance Principles for Unlocking 





The investigation by the Committee of Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters related only to the tax treatment of 
assistance provided by or on behalf of governments and international 
organizations. It is conceded that while recommendations could apply to 
private assistance, this raises a separate set of issues and is therefore not 
addressed in the paper. See E/C.18/2007/CRP.12, supra note 14, at 5.
21
IATF report, supra note 3, at 104.
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Budget support — the type of aid that is paid 
directly to a country’s general budget, and 
therefore allows the recipient country complete 
ownership over the resources — amounted to 1.9 
percent of DAC donors’ total bilateral aid 
commitments in 2016.22 This number fluctuates 
largely from country to country, with some 
institutions providing as much as 21 percent23 of 
their total donations to general budgetary 
support. Others provide much less: Norway 
contributes 1 percent24 to budget support and 
several countries contribute 0 percent,25 even with 
significant overall donations. The starkest 
contrast is in the United States,26 which in 2017 
provided 0 percent to general budgetary support, 
and 87 percent to project-type interventions, 
despite making sizeable ODA allocations.27
The U.N. supports the view that sustainable 
and long-lasting development relies on national 
ownership. However, ownership over projects 
can only be achieved through the untying of 
funds. Under the development assistance 
framework, that might be a difficult task to 
achieve, but not so much so under the 
international tax framework.
Revenue gains derived from the uneven — yet 
fair — allocation of taxing rights could allow 
countries — particularly least-developed 
countries struggling to attract investment from 
donor countries — to take control and ownership 
over their own resources and expand their 
budget.
Ian Beshalom28 has pointed to the use of the 
international tax system for redistributive 
purposes as one of the remedies against the 
frequent failures of the international aid 
framework. More recently, Miranda Stewart29 has 
defended transnational taxation as a form of 
redistribution. This is in line with the U.N. 
development system goals of the 2030 agenda for 
sustainable development.
It is unusual, but not unheard of, for tax 
treaties to foresee unilateral (nonreciprocal) 
obligations. There are several examples in treaty 
practice in which developed countries (to put it 
broadly) concede to an uneven allocation of 
source taxing rights, particularly when entering 
into a treaty with a developing country. For 
example, in the 1982 Cameroon-Canada tax 
treaty, Canada’s withholding tax allocation for 
dividends, interest, and royalties is 15 percent, 
whereas Cameroon’s is 20 percent. The same is 
true for the 1992 Canada-Zimbabwe tax treaty on 
dividend withholding (15 percent Canada, 20 
percent Zimbabwe) and the 1999 Algeria-France 
tax treaty on interest withholding (10 percent 
France, 12 percent Algeria).
Even more significant is the 1981 Morocco-
U.K. tax treaty, in which the United Kingdom has 
conceded to exempt dividend income beneficially 
owned by a resident of Morocco, while allowing 
Morocco to apply a withholding tax ranging from 
10 to 25 percent (depending on the level of 
ownership) on dividends paid to the United 
Kingdom and beneficially owned by a U.K. 
resident. The latter example could serve as a real 
case study on how countries might be able to use 
the tax system to provide development assistance 
outside the ODA structure.30
Of course, a country’s actual level of 
withholding is determined by domestic law, so it 
could be that in some cases both parties are 
applying lower withholding taxes. However, the 
domestic law treatment is not significant in this 
case, because the treaty is the instrument setting 
the ultimate “right to tax.”
As pointed out by Bob Michel, nonreciprocal 
commitments are more pronounced in bilateral 




The European Union’s Institutions’ Official Development 
Assistance for 2017 was 21 percent of contributions to budget support, 65 
percent to project-type interventions, 6 percent to technical assistance, 6 
percent to pooled programs and funds, and 2 percent to NGOs.
24
Norway provided 1 percent of contributions to budget support, 48 
percent to project-type interventions, 10 percent to technical assistance, 
and 41 percent to pooled programs and funds.
25
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, and Iceland are some of the countries 
contributing 0 percent to general budget.
26
The U.S. allocated 0.18 percent of GNI, which is far from the U.N. 
recommendation, but sums up to the sizeable contribution of $35.3 
billion in net ODA for 2017.
27
All data contained in this paragraph is derived from OECD, 
“Development Finance and Policy Trends,” supra note 16.
28
Ian Beshalom, “How to Redistribute? A Critical Examination of the 
Mechanisms to Promote Global Wealth Distribution” (2004).
29
Miranda Stewart, “Redistribution Between Rich and Poor 
Countries,” 72(4/5) IBFD Bulletin for International Taxation 297-309 (Apr./
May 2018).
30
The examples are not exhaustive; there might be other examples in 
treaty practice.
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asymmetrical levels of development. According 
to Michel, there is almost 100 percent reciprocity 
in treaties negotiated between two OECD 
member states.31 In his 2012 research, he 
concluded that nonreciprocity occurs twice as 
much in treaties signed between states with 
asymmetrical levels of development.
My proposition is to use asymmetric taxing 
rights allocation as a tool to foster development. 
Provided this tool does not have a significant 
budgetary impact on donor countries, there 
should not be much political opposition because it 
does not concern the transfer of resources — it 
concerns the waiving of taxing rights. From an 
academic perspective, this is a proposition that is 
in line with the inter-nation equity principle 
introduced in the 1970s by Richard and Peggy 
Musgrave.
Inter-Nation Equity
Inter-nation equity is a notion that was 
introduced by the Musgraves32 in the early 1970s.33 
It relates to the fundamental question of how to 
divide the gains stemming from the cross-border 
movement of labor and capital. The outcome of 
the application of the inter-nation equity 
principles depends on the extent to which the 
source state imposes taxes. Inter-nation equity is 
not a self-standing principle or norm. Whether or 
not inter-nation equity is achieved depends on the 
criteria chosen to make the evaluation. The 
Musgraves proposed three different criteria that 
can be used: the benefit principle, national rent, 
and distributional considerations.
Under distributional considerations, inter-
nation equity is achieved to the extent that the 
taxation of foreign-owned capital in the source 
state contributes to the global redistribution of 
resources and per capita income among countries. 
According to the Musgraves, this can be achieved 
by inversely linking the level of taxation 
(corporate tax and withholding tax rates) to the 
level of per capita income in developing states, 
and then linking this factor directly to the level of 
taxation in the developing state. A high level of 
asymmetry in development would confer the 
developing state the right to levy more tax, to 
offset unequal levels of development.34 A 
consequence (and really, the main impediment to 
this approach) is that the principle of formal 
reciprocity of legal obligations is sacrificed for the 
sake of redistribution.
Of course, the theory is not without problems. 
A significant criticism that has basically made it 
impracticable is that it risks deterring capital 
inflow into developing states because of the 
disproportionately high rates the source state 
applies. Until now, this issue might have been 
dealt with by making sure the capital exporting 
state (the would-be donor country) strictly 
adheres to the principle of capital export 
neutrality. However, the fact that capital export 
neutrality is not a guarantee in the eyes of the 
investing company (that is, if the ordinary credit 
in the residence state is insufficient to cover the 
tax levied in the source state), has proven to be a 
potential impediment to foreign direct 
investment. Another, less significant problem is 
that it sacrifices the principle of non-
discrimination in the source state.
The OECD’s base erosion and profit-shifting 
initiative seems to have partially addressed this 
issue, and revived the Musgraves’ doctrine, to the 
extent that countries agree that there should be an 
overall “entitlement to tax.” Under the 
Musgraves’ framework, entitlement to tax 
translates into achieving international individual 
equity: A taxpayer’s liability to his country of 
residence should be the same irrespective of 
whether income is derived from foreign or 
domestic sources.35
The more modern, anti-BEPS-derived 
construct assumes that economic operators 
should pay a fair share of tax. Conversely, states 
should levy their fair share of tax — meaning an 
31
According to Michel’s research in 2012, only 2.7 percent of the 
treaties signed between two OECD member states contained 
nonreciprocal obligations, as compared with 5.3 percent in treaties 
between an OECD and a U.N. member state. Bob Michel, “The Principle 
of Reciprocity in International Tax Treaties,” presentation in Amsterdam 
at IBFD Conference in Honour of Prof. Avv. Guglielmo Maisto (May 11, 
2012) (author’s conference notes).
32
Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, “International 
Equity,” in Modern Fiscal Issues: Essays in Honor of Carl S. Shoup 63 (1972).
33
Kim Brooks, “Inter-Nation Equity: The Development of an 
Important but Underappreciated International Tax Value,” in Tax Reform 
in the 21st Century (2008).
34
Musgrave and Musgrave, supra note 32, at 74.
35
Id. at 68.
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adequately priced, reasonable amount of tax. For 
example, if a fair share is defined as 20 to 25 
percent of the tax base, then all that countries 
would need to agree to is apportioning the proper 
amount of tax.
In the anti-BEPS movement, strong emphasis 
is laid on assigning the tax base according to 
where economic activity occurs or value is 
created. The redistributional considerations of 
inter-nation equity could be relied on to further 
shape the allocation of taxing rights between 
developed and developing states, adding a new 
criterion to the distributive rule. Should the 
developing state decide not to make use of the 
extra portion of tax base because of redistribution 
considerations (for example, if the developing 
country, as a source state, waives the right to tax 
by conferring a credit or an exemption under 
domestic law), then the residence state would be 
entitled to tax the corresponding, as yet untaxed, 
tax base to ensure the income is taxed at an 
appropriate level. This might also lock in greater 
tax certainty for the foreign direct investor, 
because its tax position will always be one of 
paying some percent to one country or the other, 
depending on the actual tax base split.36
Using the tax system may be a more modern 
and equitable way of supporting developing 
countries, especially the least developed 
countries. It allows the least developed countries 
to take control and ownership over priority 
investment areas, invest in priority areas even 
when there is no commercial interest (for 
example, sanitation and waste management), and 
allow assisted development to the extent needed.
Conclusion
What is suggested here is no simple feat. To 
provide an “economically meaningful and 
generally agreed upon division of tax base,”37 
from both a tax and distributional perspective, 
would require revisiting the preamble of the 
model agreements once more and rethinking the 
transfer system through ODA or private financing 
in light of this “new” fiscal redistributive 
approach. However, it might provide a simpler, 
more equitable alternative for offering developing 
countries, particularly the least developed 
countries, a greater say on how the funds they 
receive are assigned within their general 
budgetary framework. 
36
My assertions are not totally in line with the Musgraves’ inter-
nation equity proposition. According to the Musgraves’ theory, “inter-
nation equity is not predicated on the allocation of the tax revenue, but 
rather on the allocation of national gain, which is affected by the source 
country’s decision to tax (or not) the gain. The tax decisions of the 
residence state are irrelevant.” Under my proposition, the decisions of 
the residence state are equally relevant. See Brooks, supra note 33, at 4.
37
Peggy B. Musgrave, Tax Policy in the Global Economy: Selected Essays 
of Peggy B. Musgrave 38 (2002).
For more Tax Notes International content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
©
 2018 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
